A juvenile court may be granted considerable latitude in determining whether it should waive its jurisdiction and send a juvenile to adult court. However, due process requires a hearing (which may be informal), access by counsel to records or other reports that the court uses in making its determination, and a statement of reasons for the court's decision.

Burglary is a crimen falsi offense; a burglary conviction is therefore admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness.

Bias, dishonesty, defective ability to observe, and remembrance of the facts are all proper grounds for cross-examination.

The mere fact that persons are present in a car is insufficient to show that they knew that another occupant had a gun in their possession or that all the occupants are a part of a conspiracy to carry it in violation of law. Even evidence sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession of a gun may not be sufficient to show a conspiracy to possess the gun with other occupants of the car.

Silent observation of an illicit transaction and mere presence in the place where drugs are found are insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession of the drugs. Constructive possession is "the ability to exercise a conscious dominion over the illegal substance, the power to control the contraband, and the intent to exercise that control."

A conspiratorial agreement cannot be inferred from defendant's mere presence during an illicit transaction. There must be sufficient evidence to satisfy the fact finder beyond a reasonable doubt that a corrupt confederation had in fact been formed. Standing alone, the fact that a defendant is sitting out on the steps, accepts $50 from a police officer when so instructed by his or her spouse, and watches the police officer walk away after being handed 11 opaque bags is insufficient to prove a conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.

The finder of fact cannot infer that a defendant knew of weapon's existence simply from the fact that it was hidden in the automobile the defendant was driving.

In order to be convicted as an accessory before the fact under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), the defendant would have to plan, cooperate, assist, aid, counsel, or abet in the perpetration of the crime. Merely introducing a buyer to a seller, and not participating in or benefiting from the resulting transaction is insufficient for conviction as an accessory.

When the issue of misidentification is not an aspect of the defense, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a line of questioning that might reveal the identity of the CI.

The governmental privilege to refrain from disclosing the identity of a CI requires a "balancing of the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare [a] defense." This balance depends on "the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the [CI's] testimony, and other relevant factors." Disclosure of the informant's identity is proper when the defendant's guilt would otherwise be established solely by police testimony, based on a single observation, when testimony from a more disinterested source is available.